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RECENT CASE NOTES
held void on the presumption that the general public has relied upon the
omissions in the original patent, adopted the invention and developed the art.
Any member of the public may then bar an infringement suit on the reissue.
No actual harm need be proved, but reliance and change of position are
presumed after the time limit. Where a defendant can show he actually
relied upon the omissions, adopted the invention and developed the art he
should then be allowed to bar a suit on the reissue. He has proved the harm
which after the presumptive would be presumed. 20
Private intervening rights, if so limited and applied, would have the
following results. Utmost care would be required of an inventor in making
his original claim. His right to a reissue would not be impaired. By repeating
his original claim in the reissue he could maintain the monopoly he received
under the original patent. He would risk losing only that part of his invention
he inadvertently failed to claim. He could extend his patent to cover his
entire invention and this would be good against all except those acquiring
intervening rights before the reissue was applied for. It does not seem un-
reasonable to hold an inventor to his losses resulting from his own mistake
where he is given the power to prevent further losses by correcting the mistake.
The government grants a monopoly only on that part of the invention the
patentee claims and should not make a broadened claim retroactive against
one who has changed his position in reliance on the first monopoly.2 1
R. B. W.
PICKETING 13Y "OuTSmE" UNION-INDIANA ANTI-INJUNCrioN Acr.-Plaintiff,
operator of a small retail grocery in the city of Hammond, employed three
persons, all of whom were satisfied with their working conditions and the
relations with their employer. These employees had previously joined de-
fendant union under threat by the latter to picket their place of employment
and thus cause them to lose their jobs, but had resigned on being ordered to
strike, and were not now, nor were desirous of again becoming, members.
Defendant began to peacefully picket plaintiff's store to compel plaintiff to
sign a closed shop contract. On application for injunction, held, injunction
granted, the picketing is unlawful. For a labor union to demand that an
employer require union membership of his employees is contrary to the policy
of the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act.' Roth v. Local Union No. 1460 of Retail
Clerks Union (Ind. 1939), 24 N. E. (2d) 280.
20 Only a few decisions are based upon personal intervening rights alone.
Each was a suit on a broadened reissue secured within a reasonable time
where defendant changed his position in good faith and reliance on the
original patent. See: Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories (1928),
27 F. (2d) 744- (defendant allowed to continue to use the particular machines) ;
Bull Dog Floor Clip Co. v. Munson (1927), 19 F. (2d) 43 (defendant manu-
facturer allowed to sell articles on hand after reissue); Autopiano Co. v.
Amer. Player Action Co. (1915), 222 F. 276; Ashley v. Tatum Co. (1917),
240 F. 979 (defendant allowed intervening rights amounting to a permanent
license to manufacture and sell).
21 See Note (1931), 44 Harv. L. R. 959; Article (1934), 43 Yale L. R. 766;
Article (1935), 8 S. Cal. L. R. 288.
1 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, §§40-501 to 40-514.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The great majority of courts having held picketing legal but require that
the picketing be free from any kind of violence or intimidation,2 some of these
enjoining all picketing where there has been any force or violence present.3
A few courts have held peaceful picketing may be prohibited by statute or
ordinance.4 Where the legality of peaceful picketing is recognized 5 three
questions must be considered: (1) What constitutes peaceful picketing?6
(2) What objectives furnish a legal justification for the use of such means?
(3) Who may use the lawful means to attain the lawful objectives? The
latter question becomes even more controversial in the light of modern legis-
lation.
The classification of "lawful purpose" for which peaceful picketing, as a
"lawful means," will be upheld was obviously meant to be clarified and
extended by the Federal Anti-Injunction Act,7 and the various state statutes
modeled after it. By the literal terms of these statutes the disputants need
no longer be in an employer-employee relationship for a labor dispute to
exist, in the presence of which the issuance of an injunction will be restricted.6
Prior to the anti-injunction statutes, a majority of the courts held that
unionization was not a lawful purpose for the attainment of which peaceful
picketing would be permitted, the decisions being based on the grounds either
that it constituted an unlawful interference with the employer's business or
2American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council (1921),
257 U. S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189; Steffes v. Motion Picture Union
(1917), 136 Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524; Kemp v. Division No. 24-1 (1912),
255 Il1. 213, 99 N. E. 389; Riggs v. Cincinnati Waiters (1898), 5 Ohio Nisi
Prius 386; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers (1905), 165
Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of
Silk Workers (1934), 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172 Ad. 551; Lauf v. Shinner and Co.,
Inc. (1938), 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed. 872. Contra: Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee (C. C., S. D. Iowa E. D. 1905), 139 Fed. 582; Barnes
v. Typographical Union (1908), 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940; Beck v. Railway
Teamsters Protective Union (1898), 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Truax v.
Corrigan (1921), 257 U. S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124; Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896),
167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077. Many of the above cases may be reconciled on
their particular facts.
3 Wasilewski v. Bakers Union (1935), 118 N. J. Eq. 349, 179 AtI. 284;
Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc., v. Rifkin (1927), 245 N. Y. 260, 157
N. E. 130.
4 Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse (1914), 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657; Thomas
v. City of Indianapolis (1924), 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550. Contra: Nat'l.
Brotherhood of Operative Potters v. City of Kokomo (1937), 211 Ind. 72, 5
N. E. (2d) 624.
5 The anti-injunction statutes apparently legalize peaceful picketing in a
labor dispute. See Burns, 1933, Sec. 40-504.
6 See Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing (1936), 35 Mich. L. Rev.
73, in which the author concludes: "It is extremely doubtful . . . whether
labor organizations can lawfully engage in any forms of picketing which
attract enough public notice to be effective."
7 One of the principal purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (47 Stat.
70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. Secs. 101-115) was to correct the law as found under
Sec. 20 of the Clayton Act and as construed in Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering (1921), 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349, requiring an
employer-employee relationship for a labor dispute to exist.
8 See, fdr example, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, Sec. 40-513(c).
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that it would cause the breach of existing contracts. 9  Since the passage of
these acts, there has been a definite tendency toward holding unionization a
lawful purpose for which peaceful picketing may be carried on, even by an
"outside" union and where the employer-employee relationship is apparently
Natisfactory,10 although the weight of state authority is probably still the
other way.11 It should be noted that some of the discrepancy in the decisions
may be due to the type of business being picketed, the courts being able to
more easily find that the picketing is not "peaceful" or that there is an "un-
lawful interference" with the plaintiff's business where a retailing firm is
involved and the picketing more directly influences its customers than when
the business is manufacturing or wholesaling.
The decision in the principal case rests upon the finding by the court that
the picketing activities of the defendant were intended to coerce the employer
to require his employees to join the union and therefore were contrary to the
policy expressly declared by the statute.1 2 The court took no position as to
9 Sarros v. Nouris (1927), 15 Del. Ch. 391, 133 At. 607 (strike-injury to
employer's business); Waitresses' Union v. Benish Restaurant Co., Inc., (C. C.
A., Sth, 1925), 6 Fed. (2d) 568 (no strike, "outsiders" seeking unionization-
injury to employer's business); Webb. v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses' Union
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913), 205 S. W. 465 (no strike, "outsiders" seeking unioniza-
tion-injury to employer's business). See also Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v.
Mitchell (1917), 245 U. S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, where the court
in effect held that unionization against the employer's will is an unlawful
objective even in the absence of a strike or picketing and that it would unlaw-
fully cause the breach of existing contracts. Contra: Scofes v. Helmar (1933),
205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662 (strike); Stillwell Theater v. Kaplan (1932), 259
N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63, Cert. denied (1933) 288 U. S. 606; Kirmise v. Adler
(1933), 311 Pa. 78, 166 At. 566.
10 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (1938), 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed.
872, noted (1938) 13 Ind. L. J. 516; New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co. (1933), 303 U. S. 552, 531 S. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012; Schuster v. International
Assn. of Machinists (1937), 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50; Miller Parlor
Furniture Co., Inc. v. Furniture Workers' Industrial Union (Distr. Ct., D. N. J.
1934), 8 F. Supp. 209; American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. and H. of A.
(1936), 222 Wis. 33S, 268 N. W. 250; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin
(C. C. A., 2d, 1934), 71 Fed. (2d) 284, cert. denied 293 U. S. 595 (1934);
Cinderella Theater Co., Inc. v. Sign Writers' Local (Distr. Ct., E. D. Mich.,
S. D., 1934), 6 F. Supp. 164; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n. of
Mechanics (1936), 155 Ore. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090; Dehan v. Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees, etc. (La., 1935), 159 So. 637; Bent Steel Sections, Inc. v. Doe
(1939), 170 Misc. 736, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 920.
11 Roth v. Retail Clerks' Union (Ind., 1939), 24 N. E. (2d) 280; Simon v.
Schwachman (Mass., 1933), 18 N. E. (2d) 1; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks' Union (1935), 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372; Driggs Dairy Farms
v. Milk Drivers' & Dairy Employees' Local (1935), 49 Ohio App. 303, 197
N. E. 250; Mitnick v. Furniture Workers' Union (1938), 124 N. J. Eq. 147,
200 At. 553 (statute modeled after Clayton Act) ; Swing v. A. F. of L. (1939),
372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E. (2d) 857 (statute modeled after Clayton Act) ; Culinary
Workers' Union v. Fuller (Texas, 1937), 105 S. W. (2d) 295; Keith Theatre,
Inc. v. Vachon (1936), 134 Me. 392, 187 At. 692; McKay v. Retail Automobile
Salesmen (Cal. App., 1939), 89 P. (2d) 426.
12 ". . . the individual unorganized worker . . . should be free to
decline to associate with his fellows, . . . have full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be
free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
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whether a labor dispute was or was not involved. It is believed that it
should have ruled on the point in order to clarify the basis of its decision
since the existence of a labor dispute is usually the vital issue to be deter-
mined whenever a court invokes the anti-injunction act in reaching its de-
cision. However, under the terms of the Indiana Act, the result reached by the
court could be obtained by holding either (1) that no labor dispute existed,13
or (2) that there was a labor dispute but the acts committed by the defendant
were unlawful. 1 4 If the first alternative is to be inferred from the decision,
this question arises: Is an employer-employee relationship necessary before a
labor dispute may exist?1 5
On the other hand, if the court is saying that the purpose of the defendant
as an "outside" labor organization to achieve a closed shop by picketing is
unlawful, and therefore that the peaceful picketing is unlawful and not
within the protection of the Act, its position cannot be reconciled with the
position taken by the federal courts.1 0 That the weight of state authority is
apparently in accord with the present holding17 may mean that the state courts
intend to so narrowly construe the anti-injunction acts as to afford little more
protection to labor organizations than that given by the Clayton Act and
those state acts modeled after it which require an employer-employee rela-
tionship for a labor dispute to exist.
But if the case was decided and is to be limited to its particular facts-
where the employees have already made their choice not to join the union,
which choice the Act protects against interference by the employer, the result
may be supportable.18 From this position, however, the courts logically may
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection . . ." Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, Sec. 40-502.
But see Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (1938), 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578,
82 L. Ed. 872, wherein the Court said: "We find nothing in the declarations
of policy which narrows the definition of a labor dispute as found in the
statutes. The rights of the parties and the jurisdiction of the federal
courts are to be determined according to the express provisions applicable
to labor disputes as so defined." See also American Furniture Co. v. I. B.
of T. C. and H. of A. (1936), 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250.
13 Cf. Crosby v. Rath (Ohio, 1940), 25 N. E. (2d) 934, which cited the
principal case as supporting the court's conclusion that no trade dispute
existed.
14 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, Sec. 40-507: "No court of the state of
Indiana shall have jurisdiction to issue a . . . injunction in any case in-
volving or growing out of a labor dispute . . . except after findings of
fact by the court, to the effect; (a) That unlawful acts . . . have been
committed and will be continued unless restrained, . . ."
15 See dictum in Muncie Bldg. Trades Council v. Umbarger (Ind. 1938),
17 N. E. (2d) 828.
16 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (1938), 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578, 82
L. Ed. 872, and see footnote 10, supra.
17 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union (1935), 184 Wash. 322,
51 P. (2d) 372, and see footnote 11, supra.
18 It must be recognized, however, that organized labor cannot hope to
cope with capital in the matter of economic adjustment unless it can ex-
tend its power and effectiveness beyond the limits of the individual busi-
ness units and that to do so it must have the right to peacefully persuade
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take the further step of holding picketing activities accompanying a strike
for a closed shop enjoinable on the ground that such activities are designed
to force the employer to coerce his non-union employees (assuming they have
refused to join the union) to join such union against their will. Quaere
whether this is desirable?
S.C.
QUIETING EQUITABLE TITLE-BoUNnARIE.-A mother owned a lot on which
was situated two houses. After the marriage of plaintiff to her son, she
promised to give them one of the houses, described as "the little house
on the alley," if they would improve the property, pay the taxes,, and make
it their home. No deed for the property was ever made. Plaintiff and
her husband lived thereon for ten years, made permanent improvements, and
paid taxes on the lot. Subsequent to the death of the plaintiff's husband,
the mother deeded the entire lot to two other sons, who knew of plaintiff's
interests in the property. Plaintiff brought an action to quiet her equitable
title to that part of the lot on which the house was situated. Held, for the
plaintiff. Sweeney v. Sweeney (Ind. App., 1940), 25 N. E. (2d) 273.1
The case presents the problem as to the rights of one having a purely
equitable title to real estate to have such title quieted as against an outstanding
legal title. The plaintiff derives her equitable claim of title from a parol
promise of a gift of real estate. The authorities are agreed that, under such
facts, where possession is taken and valuable and permanent improvements
are made on the land by the promissee in reliance on the promise there is
sufficient change of position to give rise to an estoppel on the part of the
promissor, and make the promise enforceable. 2 The same facts have uniformly
been held to constitute sufficient part performance under an oral contract
to convey land to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. 3
Thus it is seen that as against the grantor there is a specificially enforceable
promise to convey land. And it has been held that such part performance in
reliance upon a promise to convey as will establish a right to specific per-
others to join its ranks. Therefore, the fact that lawful activities for that
purpose are being conducted by a union against an employer none of whose
employees is a present member of the union should not be a controlling factor
in holding such activities unlawful.
1 The mother, grantor, and her two sons, grantees of the legal title, were
joined in the suit as parties defendant. The mother disclaimed, and the
grantees defended.
2 POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3 ed., 1926), secs. 130, 131;
Horner v. McConnell (1901), 158 Ind. 280, 63 N. E. 472; Ault v. Miller
(1932), 203 Ind. 487, 181 N. E. 35; Starkey v. Starkey (1893), 136 Ind.
349, 36 N. E. 287; Burns v. Fox (1887), 113 Ind. 205, 14 N. E. 541; Horner
v. Clark (1901), 27 Ind. App. 6, 60 N. E. 732; Bevington v. Bevington
(1907), 133 Iowa 351, 110 N. W. 840, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508. Cf. Froman v.
Froman (1859), 13 Ind. 317.
3 Horner v. McConnell (1901), 158 Ind. 280, 63 N. E. 472; Starkey v.
Starkey (1893), 136 Ind. 349, 36 N. E. 287; Burns v. Fox (1887), 113 Ind. 205,
14 N. E. 541; Cutsinger v. Ballard (1888), 115 Ind. 93, 17 N. E. 206; Osterhaus
v. Creviston (1916), 62 Ind. App. 382, 111 N. E. 634.
